Introduction
Not long ago the walls of the world's great an museums were covered with realist poruaiture. landscapes. and sacred scenes. Thai was pre1ty much 1he exrent of canvas art. During the las1 hundred years. however. the scope of museum collections has become much more diverse. One can still find a lifelike portrail by Rubens, an idyllic landscape by Constable, or a sublime Christ scene by Raphael. Indeed, U1ere even seems to be a bias towards realist an, what the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty called the "objectivist" prejudice.' It is as though we expect art to function as a <lescription of the world in which we live. But museums have also become showcases for mo<lern painting, that is, so-called abstract painting. Works of this son seem to be disengaged from the recognizable featwes of our everyday world. from the same features that enable us 10 feel that we belong to !his worl<l, and thus seem 10 res isl our objccti vist prejudlce. 2 In ilS extreme fom1, thlsdetachmem from thesurrounding world appears to be nothing less than an obliteration of the familiar. a <lisruption in the man-world relationship. References to familiar things are no longer evident. With no clue as to what is represented, such painting exhibits an "inli<lelityto the familiar. " 3 But if abstract painting renounces the world of physical appearance as itS starting point. our feeling of being at home in that world may give way to the feeling of alienation that is alluded to by Barrett and Gadamer.
A sense of esrrangement was sure! y felt by much of the viewing public when these paintings made ll1cir debut on u,e art scene. Their siruggle to orient each painting int wo-dimensional space, so as to find some recognizable object and keep their objcctivist perspective, was nolh.ing less than an encounter with somelh.ing alien. But what about all the generations of viewers that have followed them? Are we less likely 10 experience aesthcUc alienation? In this paper. I propose 10 show that aesthetic alienation is less likely 10 be experienced by present-day "objectivist" viewers of abstract art as long as their cognitive funds are gradually enriched by the scientific and technological advances of the 1wentlcth cemury. 'This is because such enriched funds. by providing a particular mode of access to the world. allow today's spectators 10 recognize and identify much more of the pictorial content of paintings that those viewers who first confronted thc works of abstract pai ntcrs.
Pan One: Abstrac1 Painting Let us begin by considering the son of art that is commonly associalcd with acsll1elic alienation. namely. abstract painting. In spite Of the fact U1at the Romanticism of John Constable's East Anglia landscapes is easily distinguished from the Ahstrac1 Expressionism of Clyfford Still's asymmetrical planar formations. it is imponam to no1e that art. ists and art historians have found themselves in a quandary over the nature of abstract art. The art historian Marcel Brion remind< us nf this ctifficnlly In the following passage:
Few icnns in lhe vocabulary or Ilic history or art lend llicmsclves so much to confusion and cquivoca1ion as the word ''abs1tact." Tbis is beeause no vahtl tleliniuon of II actually exisL~ and.even more so. because !here is no agrccmcm abou1 lhe nature of lhe works 10 which one can apply lhc tcnn .
• Yet much oflhls discussion comains ccnain adjectives designating the world of abstract an.terms like ' non-objective' and 'non-representational' .
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Perhaps the best way to understand how these terms apply to abstract painting is 1 0 compare their application with the use of the terms 'objective' and 'rcp,-esentational' in describing rcaliSl painting. that is. painting that approaches "observation and ponrayal of the day-to-day essence of thlngs and beings, while adding to U1is objective truU1 as much as it can contain of the subjective feelings of Uie anist. ''6 Let us take. for cxa.mptl:. If we construe meaning or the function of a sign to be referential, then meaning involves three terms: first, an objec1 that functions as a sign or vehicle of meaning; second. another objcc1 U1a1 is meant by the sign; and lh.ird. an in1crpreter for whom the two objects are united by the relation of meaning.• In realist painting. then, wehaveanobject inthefonnof a colored shape on Uie canvas. the sign, and another object, the referent of the sign, which is a Uling in the world. In Uic case of Breezing Up. the representations (or signs) tha1 Homer gives us are qujte falUiful to that which they signify. The waves, for instance, look like the waves that can be seen on the surface of any large body of water. But surely not so faithful that the painted waves that appear to splash against his sailboat arc present-at-hand rather than represented. for they would never wet a vlc.,.'Cf's outStrctcllec! nand. "No painting," ii is said, "is ns concrete as an objec1 in na1urc •... " 9 Toe point here is not that Homer's waves fall to achieve lhiee-cli mcnsionality. Rather it is the point that the images or designs on the canvas (the signilicrs), like the waves in Breezi11g Up, resemble physical objec,ts in the world (the signified).
But not all paint. ings have representations as realistic as those of Homer's, which is to suggest that realism Is a matter of degree. 1lle acsthetician Monroe C. Beardsley makes this point in his Aesthetics when he writes that "representational design ... [is) more or less abstract . ...
• Abstract' Is the converse of ·realistic,' in one ofits senses: 10 the alienation that arises from abstract an to be nothing less than a separation from the aesthetic aspect of the cultural life of society. It is defined In terms of an "enormous gap between the traditional form and content of Western art and the ideals of contemporary :irtJsts."" Form and content are both crucial in this regard. 1l1e strict adherence to traditional form, which Included an uncompromisi ng respect for linear perspective, solidity, and three-dimensionality. has been made incidental. if not altogether repudiated by modern non-representational artists beginni ng with the Cubist movcmentin U1cearly 1900s. lllis response, according to G3damer. was the start or a profound transformation in an. for it "led to the total elimi nation or any reference to an external object of the process of anistic creation."•' In addition, there was the break with traditional content, which construed man as a rational animal living in a familiar and intelligible world. According t0 Barrett, then, this break with tradition means that everything is ques1ionabtc, 1iroblernmlc ... . Hence the themes that obsess ho1h modem art :>nd exiswntial philosorhy are the alicna1i .. , and suangeness of man in his world; the contradic1orincss. feebleness. and contingency of human existence: the central and overwhelming reality of time for man who has lost his anchorage in the eternal." Although this wholesale divorce from tradition may be overstated, Gadamcr is nevertheless convinced of its importance:
It rcmnlns an open question whether (l( not Uiis denial of our realistic expectations is ever really total. But one thing is quiteccnain: the naive assumpt. ion that lhe picture is a view-like that which we bnvedaily in our experience or nnture or of nature shaped by man-h:u clearly been fundamentally destroyed. We can no longer see a Cubist picture oc a nonobjective p:1in1ing at a glance. with a merely passive gaze. We must make an active conuibu1ion or our own and maxe an elTon 10 synthesize the outlines of the various ptnncsas Uiey appear on tile canvas. Only then, perhaps. can we be seired and uplifu:d by the profound harmony and rightncs.~ or a work, in the smne way a.~ readily happened in carHcr times on the basis of a pictorial content co1runon to all."
The most cursory reading of Gadamer's works. then, suggcslS that contemporary abstract and non-objective an is unfamiliar to us. and it is this unfamiliarity that ls part and parcel of Its alienating naturc.w In U1e main, aesthetic alienation is an inability to relate toat least some works of an which
eventually leads 10 a feeling of separa1ion. of esuangemem, of disunity on the part of Uic viewer. In short. U1c viewer Jacks the proper rela1edness to these works and is separated from at least a portion of the cultural life of a society.it Regardless of the extent and intensi1y of this estrangemen1, Its basis Is always the same: a confrontation willl the unfarniUar. The person gazing at U1c painting docs not recognlzellle plc1orial contents as portraying things in lllc world. TI1ecotorcd shapes on the canvas do not represent Utlngs for that person. It therefore lacks the son of referential mearung that is associated with representational 3!1. There is an object which is thought to function as a sign as well as an interpreter of this object. But there appears to be no object thal is meant by the "sign," that is. a referent in the world. We have Jost the amalgam of sign and referent Of course. some migh1 argue that this definition of aesthetic alienation is 100 limiled insofar as it only covers one son of alienation. that is. the alienation that stems from an absence of any sort ofidcntification of the kind of object we are dealing with, whether it be a sailboat. a fisherman, or blue sky. What it does nol include. they might argue (and rightly so). is aesthetic alienation wW1 reganl 10 how somcU1lng is portrayed. A feminist aestheUclan, for example. might argue vehcmenlly Uiat she experiences a feeling of separation. of es1tangcmen1. of disunity whcnc,-cr she views one of the earliest trc3llllcnts of the femala nude in the Renaissance, that is, Sandro Ooticelli 's The Birth oJVe1111s (aflcr 1482). In shOn , she is unable to rela1e to this work of 3!1. ancl is therefore alienated from il Moreover, a similar response might be given by some men who view certain paintings. Indeed. some men may be no more able to rd ate to the bru1ali1y depicted in Nicolas Poussin's The Rape a/the S11bi11e Wome11 (before 1637)or the arrowriclclled body of a saint in Andrea Mantegnas's St Sebc,stim1 (about 1455-60) than women arc able to relate to the naked women in Ono Dix's Three Women (1926) or the partially clothed females in Pablo Picasso's Th•o Women R111111i11g 011 a Beach ( 1922). To rnlk about "kinds" of aesU1ctic aliena1ion. however. ls not so much a challenge 10 thedcflniUon of aesU1euc alienation that is used in this paper. especially since the paper's focus is abstract art, as it is a reminder that we can experience alienation even while we view the paintings of artists like Cons1ablc and Homer, albeil a less fundamental sort of alienation given that one mus1 he able 10 identify an object before one can be alienated from it in terms of how the object is portrayed.
The key to apprecia1ing this lapse in recognition. regardless oflhc kind of alienation, may be found in whal Gadamcr and others have said about perception. panicu l:trly aes1hetic perception. Perception ls not something 14 The point here is not just that pure seeing is a distinct possibility. Rather it is U1c more important poinl tha1 lhis son of seeing is not primary bul secondary. It is a derived seeing !hat Is far removed from our uuerances about this or that thing that reflect the richness or our language.
Gaaamer is not alone in imbuing aesthetic perception with meaning. 'The cognitive na1urc of aesU1ellc perception is perhaps best presented in E. H. Gombrich's most influential work.Art and lllusio11. Theroleof"mind sets" and "schemas." items which arc akin 10 what I refer 10 as "cognitive funds," is indicated in his reference to U1c "myth of the innocent eye":
Whenever we receive a visual impression. we react by docketing i~ filing i~ grouping it in one way or another, even if the impression is only that of an inkb!Ot or a fingerprint. Roger Fry and the impressionists talked or the difficultyoffindingout what things lookcd likc 10 an unbiased eye because of what they called the "co,1ocp1ual habits" necessary 10 life. But if these habits arc necessary co life, the postulacc of an unbiased eye llemands the impossible .... The innocent eye is a myth." Seeing is. inshon. never just a 1113Uer of registering unconceptualizcd sensedata. According 10 Gombrich, then, there is no separalion between Impressions and cogniti vc constructions. 26 The perception of art entails a person's cognitive fund, 3nd it is this fund, acquired over many years, that allows a person to see whal others. who have acquired a sintllar fund, see. To be sure, many of us have similar cognitive funds that allow us to see U1e same building, dog. or automobile. And this applies to paintings as well. If the distinctive characteristics or a sailboat are part of a person's cognitive 155 .. . . ,.,, . . ..
lnlerestingly enough, il is this notion of cognitive fund that Unks alienalion to abs1rac1 an. Some persons feel alienaled when they look at abstracl painlings, either having no idea whal 10 say or making comments such as "l don't undersland art these days," because they find certain works of art 10 be unfamiliar or unrelaled to the world U1ey live in, and U1ese works are unfamiliar or unrelaled because !hey do nol reOecl the individual's cognitive fund. Bul must the presem-day viewer of abstract an have such an experience? I believe this need nol be the case. In facl, I believe today's audience is less likely 10 be alienalcd by such an.
Part Three: Acslhetic Alienation and Cognilive Funds ll mighl be argued lhal U1e experience of aesthetic alienation increases in scope and imensiiy as a person becomes more educated If so. alienation is direcll y prop0rtional 10 the growth of one's cognitive fund. "If alienation is more widespread now then it used 10 be." says Waller Kaufmann, "it is because more people receive more education today than formerly.'' 27 This is qulle plausible given the earlier discussion of the kind of aesthetic alienalion that sicms from how something is portrayed 10 the objeclivist viewer. It might be said oflhc fcmalcacsthctician, whose cognitive fund has undergone a change such that she now declares herself lo be a "feminist aeslhetician." lhat her sludy or gender relations has left her unable 10 relate to Boticelli · s depiction of women. thereby explaining her alienation from his The Birth of Venus. The converse may also be true, however. A person may be less apl 10 experience aesll1etic alienation as lhe scientific and lechnological achievemenls of lhe age are added to his or her cognitive stock. 'This is because the sons of images lhal seemed to be unfamiliar or unrelaled to lhe world are gradually identified as being a part of our world. This is not lo say that no one undergoes U1e experience of alienation when viewing abslracl an. Dul whal was though! 10 be abstract and nonrepresenlational fifty years ago may not be construed as such today. As an acute observer of our age has put il:
By the late twentiethcen1ury. in ways nevcrbcforcconceivable, images of the incomprehensibly small and the unimaginably large became part of everyone's experience. The cuhure saw photographs of galaxies and of atoms. No one has lO imagine, witll Leibniz, what the universe might be like on microscopic or telescopic scales-microscopes an<l telescopes made those images part of everyday experience." Such images, then, give us a point of reference for some of what we find in abstracl painting. This leads Fcibleman 10 claim thal non-objecti vc art does represent, and lherefore it is entirely inaccuralC lo conceive of it as nonrepresentational. The represenlalions cllffer from those found in the works of nineteenlh-cenlury Realisls like Homer insofar as lhey are representations of abstractions lhal parallel ll1e abstractions of lhe world of science. 29 Whal are thought of as non-objective works of an are not non-objective at all, but ac1ua11y works of art Iha! represent lhe Jess familiar world of science. ~ this can take place without the arlisl 'S inlention of doing anything of the lcind. As Fe1bleman puts it, when he remarks on the work or various members of lhe New York School:
Pollock's pruntings endeavor to attain to a kind of qualitative chaos, asllllC of perfecl disorder. They could as well have re)Tescn1ed a photomicrogrnph Of Cal cortex, or tile paths of the molecules in a heated gas enclosed w1tll1~ a rec1.1ngular vessel. Witll a linlc patienl searching among photographtc plates of d,s1.1nt galaxies, one might find thal the paintings of de Koonmg and of Tobey are reprcscnuuional after all.'° We can clarify !his broadening of the scope of representational painting lo include some. if nol all, works thought 10 be abstracl, by citing specific examples in which isomorphisms can be discerned between images from artisls and images from scientisls. The works oflwo American artists, the Abstracl Expressionisl Barnell Newman and the Constructionist Charles Biederman clearly suppOrt this expansion. Newman's Vir Heroicus Sublimis (1950, 1951) is an extremely large canvas (eight by eighteen feet), the background of which is a single homogeneous color, a monochromatic field of cadmium red. divided by "zips" or exceedingly thin strips of the same color or conlrasling color U1at splil the huge red expanse vertically. At first glance, it may nol offer lhe viewer wiUt a familiar Image, with a configuration of paint arranged on U1e canvas lhal resembles and, thus, represents something in the world. But ll1e siluation is much diffcrcnl for the viewer who is well-acquainted with aiomic absorption spectroscopy. Vir Heroicus Sublimis resembles !hat pon ion of 1hedark-linespec1rumof sunlighl that has a wavelcng{li of approximately 700 nm (the red band of lhe spectrum). Toe only difference is U1a1 Newman's painting has vertical slrips of red. while. and yellow-brown, whereas lhe dark-line spectrogram of sunlight has dark "Fraunhofer" lines. Co11s1ruc1io11 (1940) , by Biederman, is a much smaller work made of painted wood and metal rods lhal crisscross one anolher. Again, looking at Ulis work may nol remind lhe viewer of anything in the world. Having some knowledgeofX,raycllffraction. however, will provide the viewer willia cogniiive fund U1at will al leas! make il p0ssible lhal he or she will see a struciural configuralion in this work of art U1a1 is similar to the divergent beam X-ray diffraction patterns from single crystals of Chemical substances. Isomorpltisms such as these. then, suggest that in at least some cases. what was once ll1ough1 10 be an escape from nature turns out to be nollting of the kind. TI1ey are more or less a means of glimpsing and comprehending Ille world Illar we live in.
To make Ille inference that a few isomorphisms demonstrate that abstract art in general is representational , of course. is anolller matter: Picking out a couple of works that are isomorphic is not sufficient to make such a general ization. Pan of the problem. however. is that to become aware of these isomorphisms requires the appropriate cognitive fund, a fund that is only established after some study of the discipline. Ard lltis is something lllat few of us ha veover a wide range of disciplines. Yet 10 find considerable resemblance in Ille i mages offered to us by artists in paintings and mixed media projects by doing no more Ulan p0inting to a few spectrograms and X-ray diffraction patterns says something about the p0ssibili1y of finding further isomorphisms. The investigation of lltings large (for example, galaxies) and small (for example, particles) provides us wiU1 innumerable instances of similarity and, thus. familiarity. It i s just a matter of having a cognitive fund lllat is tuned 10 such imagery.3 1 Of course, some philosophers might sugge.~1 caution at lltis point. One such philosopher is Deardsley, who distinguishes between suggestive and non-suggestive non-representational painting. Beardsley appears to be critical of any attempt to expand U1e scope of representational an, not simply because he seems unwilling to reduce the number of notable and distinctive characteristics that a design must have in common with an obj ect in nature for the design 10 depict something, and hence, to represent somellting. but because he thi n. ks Uiat not having enough of these characteristics still allows a design to at least suggest an object in the world willlout representing it. 32 So ii is not an all or none proposition for him. Abstract expresslon1St paintings, for instance, have "areas U1a1 suggest, however vaguely, such lltings as insects, femalcbodies, crees, machinery, and rocks, though willlout representing them, and U1e suggestions of different areas cohere to some degree. " 33 Tilis is suggestive non-representational art, exemplified by such 
number of notable and distinctive characteristics in common with anything, including Ille spectrogram of sunlight, for it to be either representational or suggestive. Willi regard 10 Ille Janer, the insufficient number of characteristics would make it more of a case of ''reading something into the design." As Beardsley writes about such art, I suppose one could say lha1a squareon Ille balhroom noorsuggestsa box, a cabin, or a barn. but U1is would be an odd and unnecessary way of speaking. lf you cannot connect these suggestions with suggestions from olher shapes in the pauem, it would be more like reading something into And second. even if we accept Beardsley's distinction. representation and suggestion still have something in common, that is, they both involve familiar characteristics bet ween the design and an object in Ille world. And this is imp0nant, for wheU1cr an individual undergoes !he experience of aesthetic alienation i s dependent upon having an objcctivist prejudice as well as a cognitive fund U1at does not allow U1e viewer to be familiar with the sons of objects that may be referred to by the painting.
A note shOul d be Interjected here concerning the conc.Iilions of aesU1etic alienation, for what has been discussed so far ntight suggest that the only way in which a viewer with an objcctivist prejudice can become less vulnerable to aesthetic alienation is by enhancing his or her cognitive fund through learning about Ille latest scientific discoveries and iechnological innovations. But to say tllis would be to unduly restrict tJ1e scope of cognitive enhancement and to associate it wiU1 j ust one condition, i.e., the familiarity condition. l11e problem wiU1 this is that cognitive enhancement can also occur by learning about an-its technical aspects. its history, and its art. ists-which could replace the ohjectivi st prejudice with an approach lllat is Jess encumbered by a search for the familiar. Thus, learning about art may have Ille beneficial effect of making the viewer less likely to experience alienation. But for the great mass of people who do not partake in this son of cognitive enhancement, it will be tl1tough the assimilation of knowledge about science and technology that will underlie their increasing resistance to aesthetic alienation.
Following Feibleman's line of argument. then, we find the images of science and technology in the abstractions of today's an, allowing us to become attached to the world without the experience of aesthetic alienation. It is by stressing the dyad of resemblance-representation that we find more and more that is familiar in what we see when we took at abstract paintings.
With an enriched conceptual fund, an objectivist viewer may not only say "I see an expanse of red," but he or she may say "That looks like a spectrogram." It is this enrichment. perhaps more Ulan anything else. which helps to solidify our attad1ment to abstract works of art.
Conclusion To whatever degree of abstraction a painting may attaln. the worldliness of that painting is measured by the degree to which its appreciators undergo tlle experience of alienation. Toe more a person's cognitive fund is enriched by tile assimilation of modern scientific discoveries and technolog1cal innovations, the less likely heor she will experience aesthetic alienation. If our cognitive funds are truly fashioned in this way, and if attenation is in inverse proportion to our familiarity wiU1 the images that wt: see when we look at a painting, then the appropriation of science and technology into our lives will lead 10 a reduction in aesU1etic alienation.
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Tilis implication leads me to the following final thought. What has been discussed so far is twcnticth·ccntury Western art and soc iety. But what about ar1 forms of other societies? 11 is no1 too terribly difficull to imagine a people who are totally immerse~ in, for example. traditional Amazonian an rather Ulan the cosmopolitan an of Brazil. And to make it more interesting, let us suppose U1at the traditional art is representational. Would anyone in such a traditional society experience aesthetic alienalio_n? Woul~ there be persons estranged from at least a portion of the cultural life of their community? Probably. In llliscase. however, the distinguishing characteristic between those who are alienated and those who are not would be closely associated wiU1 the age of Uie individual insofar as U1e younger members of the community would nol have sufficiently appropriated the knowledge of his or her forefathers through oral histories. Each of their cognitive funds would not be as developed as U1ose of the elders oflhecommunity. To think, then. Uiat a day will come when aesthetic alienation will be an experience oflhe past is to dwell upon the fantastic. There will always be those whO feel 160 separated from some aesU1etic aspect of their culture so long as there are differences in the cognitive funds of' the members of the community. objecL~ such as driftwood cm, also be wnsideted a~ works of art. This is because anifactuality is conferred on an object. If this ts so. then it would be con.~istent for Dickie 10 argue that a spectrogram and a phmoof an X-ray diffraction pattern wou. ld become works of art if they were offered as candidates for appreciation. And this could be done by exhibiting u,esc objccLs m the Chicago Art Institute. 36 Some may infer from what has been said that scientific images produce the same son of alienation as art, and that such alienation can also be relieved through familiarity. But if alienation is brought about by confronting the unfamil~'lt as well as accepting theobjcctivist prejudice, then an analogous situation may not arise with regard 10 scientific images, for su,h a prejudice may not be part and parcel of our undcrsiamling of tllc scicntilic enterprise. Interestingly enough, lllas has an implication for aesthetic alicn:\tion, for one might argue that a rec.luction in this sort of alienation could be brough1 about by dispensing with the objectivist prejudice, that is. no longer expecting to see the fmniliar on canvas. Upon acceptance of a paper for publication, the author will be requested to provide the editor with a computer diskette holding the fileofthernanuscriptin either Macintosh or MS-DOS format; Microsoft Word and WordPerfect data files are strongly preferred.
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